The Negative Community: Categorization and Control
The basis of all domination is the absence of reciprocation
- Jean Baudrillard, La Violence du Mondial -
In The Invention of World Religions Tomoko Masuzawa sets out to trace the genealogy of the ‘world religions’ discourse which has become so prevalent in our time. Reading her intriguing account of the movements of this discourse, I found myself wondering whether the genealogy of this discourse is part of a larger context.
The book addresses a central question: why was there a sudden surge of interest in religions that were other than Christianity in the 19th century? Was it sheer interest or fascination? Was it to improve Christian self-understanding? Was it the sudden rise of secularism that consciously or unconsciously brought about an attempt to locate answers elsewhere, in religions that were other than Christianity, which was perhaps deemed to have ‘failed’ to keep at bay the flood of secularism? Was it the ‘spiritualist’ attempt to understand the world and to locate the universal core of the one, true ‘Religion’ underlying the diversity of world religions? Most of the texts that Masuzawa explores hint at or explicitly refer to one or more of these reasons; however, these reasons are all to a large extent simply foreground, as Masuzawa herself recognizes. Throughout the book, but especially in the final chapter, Masuzawa offers the possibility that the pluralist world religions discourse is perhaps indicative of the transplantation of the European project of hegemony from one context or discourse to another, particularly if we look at the work of Weber’s contemporary, Ernst Troeltsch.
So it would seem that the legacy of the world religions discourse, at least to some extent, is the European project of hegemony, of world domination. This may likely be the motive force underlying the world religions discourse and the championing of pluralism, but one that would only be in the background of the genealogy of the discourse as the discourse developed among scholars, that is, in the field of research itself. No scholar, especially as the treatments of the other religions became more and more sympathetic, that is, more politically correct, would want this motive of hegemony to become foreground, since ultimately the myth of scholarly objectivity is a highly valued and respected narrative. However, well into the 20th century, European governments, and by extension their citizenry, never shied away from being explicit about their imperialist, colonial or hegemonic motivations in deciding and implementing foreign policy in a ‘pluralist’ and ‘inclusive’ mode. Even today a government as politically correct as the United States, with its diverse media-based technologies of manipulation and propaganda distribution, has no reservations in openly declaring that securing ‘democracy’ for all the nations of the world is in its own best interest, that such a project will strengthen its security and solidify its power so that it may continue fighting to expand the dominion of the free world and the ideals of ‘freedom’, ‘human rights’ and the like.
This is all foreground and simple to spot, in fact it is meant to be so, since there is no nation that would openly declare that it is against such noble ends as stability and security, democracy and freedom. As long as the free world, namely the West, is powerful and secure, so too, goes the logic, is the rest of the world. Freedom and democracy are safe insofar as the West is in control of world destiny. The interests of the West thus become synonymous with those of the rest of the world.
As Masuzawa herself shows, in his 1891 Elias P. Ely Lectures Frank Field Ellinwood could and was willing to openly speak about the “great conquest” of Christianity “against the heathen systems of the East”(101). Even George Matheson, who spoke about “reconciliation” with other religions, only allows for such a plurality insofar as it exists beneath the natural hegemony of Christianity: “for each and all there is a seat in the Christian Pantheon”(86). He leaves no doubt that the pantheon itself is Christian.
So if the legacy of the world religions discourse, European or Western hegemony, is itself foreground, even to some extent explicitly in the objective, non self-interested scholarship, at least early on, when political correctness was not the great virtue that it later became, does this signal that there is another, perhaps more complex, background underlying the genealogy of the discourse? To find an answer to this question we have look at the broader context of modernity in the 18th and 19th century, during which time the world religions discourse was in its embryonic stages.
The work of Michel Foucault offers us a starting point. In the late 1970s Foucault began to study what he termed la gouvernementalité, a term meant to denote the techniques and procedures used to categorize and direct human behaviour in order to better control human resources. The goal of such technologies is to solidify the politico-economic rule of a government over its sphere of influence. The German Polizeiwissenschaft, as Foucault points out, was an exemplary manifestation of this method of categorization and control. It developed in the 18th century and its primary objective was the maximization of the economy of life administration in order to maximize governmental power. The goal of governmental power was ‘biopolitical’, that is, the administration of life.
The nexus of power and knowledge is the core of biopolitics, which is why contemporaneously there developed in the 18th century a hierarchy of knowledge, wherein access to information and knowledge became the basis for modern class divisions. Physicians and scholars began to form the new secular priesthood and institutions of higher learning, the new churches, multiplied across Europe and North America. The biopolitical movement and the need for a secular priesthood arose as an attempt to confront the sudden increase in population and the massive influx of information and knowledge, which occurred to a large degree due to the expanding geopolitical context brought about by European imperialism and colonialism.
It is perhaps only against this background that we can begin to situate and better understand the genealogy of the modern discourse of world religions. Within this context, the genealogy of this discourse becomes a minor species or branch of the core genealogy underlying modernity, of the genealogy of biopolitics. However, it seems that the motive force underlying the movement of biopolitics is itself hegemonic. Yet there is a fundamental difference here and one which, as we shall see, reveals that there in fact does exist a form of community and egalitarian pluralism binding the ‘Christian West’ and ‘non-Christian other’. Whereas the hegemonic nature of the world religions discourse was and, as indicated above with the example of the US, still is openly, though somewhat differently, hegemonic, the hegemonic nature of the biopolitical discourse was predominantly and is now entirely inconspicuously hegemonic. The reason for this is that the hegemony of the world religions discourse has always been other oriented, that is, the object of domination has always been a foreigner, the East, for example, whereas biopolitical hegemony is both other and self oriented. Biopolitical hegemony or governmentality originally began as an attempt to categorize and control local or native populations and only later, through imperial and colonial expansionism, foreign populations. Political power never openly subverts itself.
The new information and knowledge that scholars in the 18th and 19th centuries studied and categorized not only served as the means by which European governments were able to establish vast and powerful technologies for dominating foreign populations, but also as the means by which these same governments were able to develop complex technologies for dominating their own native populations. This secular priesthood was seminal in helping develop the technologies necessary to control the massive modern governmental systems that are in place in our time. They are also, whether they are aware of it or not, still indispensible for its continued operation and sustainment.
In this context the project of 19th century comparative theology or of anthropology, of studying and categorizing the foreign other in order to conquer and bring it within its own dominion, was no different from the core biopolitical project of modernity: the study, categorization and control of all life, whether native or foreign. The assumed superiority of the ‘Christian crusaders’ whose comparative work was meant to show the superiority of the Christian religion was exactly that, assumed, with little or no basis in reality, at least as concerns the mechanisms of political power or domination. To be sure, the West has always had a privileged position in modernity, politically, economically and otherwise, but this does not alter the core reality that they inhabit the same community as the rest of the world, the negative community governed by biopolitical technologies of domination. This is the true ‘egalitarian pluralism’ created and sustained by the biopolitical order of modernity.

Hey Babak,
I feel that your blog was quite loaded in terms of its concepts this week, and after sitting and pondering over your considerations, I find your conclusions rather acute. I appreciate your work in outlining the underlying motive of modernity as being biopolitical and find your observations about this motive both thought-provoking and enlightening. Surely, the underlying problems of the west attempting to dominate the rest of the world are very deeply engrained in our societal consciousness, and, of course, the 19th century movement of comparative religions, as you have pointed out, still demonstrates this underlying motif of ‘dominating’ the rest of the world in some sort of way. Since, as you have, seemingly, demonstrated that the 19th century preoccupation with the notion of “world religions” seems to fit into this larger portrait of western control over the rest of the world, and since this mentality appears to be so prevalent even contemporarily, I wonder what sort of solution or alternative you would propose to this way of thinking. In particular, is there some sort of way that scholars or politicians might be able to (or would they even be willing to) change this western mentality of supremacy and power? Any method to bring about such a shift would seem to first of all require an alternative; in addition, such a method, to me, to break the western preoccupation of dominance seems indiscernible. Also, I can’t help but wonder when reading your blog, “who is to blame?” That is, who is responsible for this struggle for control? Are there select individuals who may be considered guilty for allowing this to happen or are we collaboratively responsible? Please let me know what solution(s) you would suggest.
Cheers,
Andrew
Hi Babak,
I very much enjoyed reading your blog entry this week. It also occurred to me while reading Masuzawa that the discourse on world religions was part of larger European project. I was thinking not so much of the will to hegemony but the will to self-knowledge. It is funny that you should talk about Foucault’s essay on “governmentality” because this also popped into my head, though I didn’t think it through nearly as well as you! As I was reading, I began to think of the discourse on the world religions as a sub-narrative of the larger colonial project during this period of the long 19th century. To my mind the colonial project of “knowing” is two-part: firstly, they were tireless in their quest to classify and categorize peoples and practices as a means of “knowing” their newly acquired territories and, secondly, they used the study of the “other” as a way of coming to “know” themselves. An “other” is a perfect sounding board for our own problems, no? In this way, both the colonizer and the colonized were subject to a larger project of knowledge gathering, the end goal of which Foucault argues, if I remember clearly, was to limit the individual and bring them under the control of the government. I have to wonder, if this is in fact the case, what can we do about it? Simply recognizing what is taking place is not enough. Has or can anyone suggest an exit strategy?
Amy
Andrew and Amy,
Thank you both for your comments. You both ask whether there is a positive response to the biopolitical governmentality of modernity. I would contend that the short answer is ‘no’. The nature of the biopolitical order of modernity – in my formulation this order is radically different from Foucault’s and Agamben’s, more recently – is such that it denies the potential for any and all reciprocation.
Given this, there are two possibilities: (1) moving outside the system, which would not alter or negate the system in any way, since all externalization of this nature is necessarily marginal and only symbolically subversive – the work of Roland Barthes and Jean Baudrillard is essential here; and (2) destroying the system en masse and in toto. I really mean destroying it and doing so violently. The latter is the project that modernity resists and which is something that daily drifts further away from the realm of the possible, at least in my estimation and hopes. This latter project has been expressed vividly by such thinkers as Marx and Bakunin and monumentally synthesized in a poetic and highly original way by Guy Debord in his La Société du spectacle. It has been translated into English with the same title and is a short and brilliant read. I believe he has offered the most relevant critique and positive project for our current, ‘postmodern’ modernity. I would highly recommend this book, if you already haven’t read it.
One last thing, directed at Amy, I agree about the will to knowledge, certainly, that’s why I speak of the nexus of power and knowledge as the core of biopolitics. Without the ‘will to knowledge’ there could not have been a biopolitical order. You are right, this is essential!
Thanks again, to both of you.
babak
Hi Babak,
I found your post this week very interesting and informative. I must say, I agree with Andrew in asking the question: knowing that the 19th century movement of comparative religions illustrates the European pursuit of hegemony, what alternatives do we have as modern scholars of religion? In continuing to study religion within “Western” institutions and employing the various “Western” methodologies that Masuzawa describes in The Invention of World Religions, are we not continuing, even subconsciously, the “Western” pursuit of knowledge-gathering? As long as we continue this endeavor, it seems that we will be perpetuating the “Western” mission of accumulating knowledge, both of the “other” and of ourselves, as Amy mentioned in her response. I am not sure if it is possible to break this process. After all, the pursuit of knowledge within the university system is by its nature, a process of “consuming” or taking in vast amounts of knowledge. Even if we ourselves, unlike the European powers of the past, do not intend to exert physical dominance over other cultures and civilizations, our pursuits within the academic world are in many senses, a form of intellectual “conquering”, a gaining control over a particular field of knowledge. In continuing our research and gaining expertise in our particular topics of study, we will continue to analyze, discuss and re-analyze within the boundaries of “Western” language and methods. Can we function within a system of dominance without pursuing this goal ourselves, when the very system itself was designed to achieve this end? I myself am not sure of any viable alternatives or solutions.
- Adam
Babak,
Thanks for your response to my question. Your two possibilities were both what I, also, saw as a responses to getting away from our current western mentality. Surely, both of these options are extremely difficult ones, but, perhaps, the only options currently available to us. The first, what would appear to be a painfully ‘long-term’ project, and the second extremely difficult to accept. Are either of these options within the range of our society? The first might be an option because it does not necessarily have to be so drastic and can take place over time. The second, however, seems to me, similar to what you explained in your blog, to be one that “the mass” may not be willing to accept. Thus, both of these options seem, to me, to be outside of our lifetime. If, however, either of these routes (and I would assume the first if either are attainable) are in our grasp, would we have to have something to look forward to in terms of a goal or telos?
Andrew