Self-othering Tradition

 

Notre Dame de Paris (Fall 2006)

Notre Dame de Paris (Fall 2006)

 

Tradition is the illusion of permanence.

 

                                      – Woody Allen -

 A common theme running through this week’s readings was that there is a core identity or internal sameness that sustains an essential traditionality within a given tradition as it externally changes.  Eric Hobsbawm speaks of tradition as an “invariance” which “imposes fixed (normally formalized) practices, such as repetition” (2) as opposed to an ‘invented tradition’ which is “characterized by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition” (4); Nicholas Thomas of a self/other logic whereby there is ‘objectification’ and conscious and hence external creation and structuring of a tradition (214-215); and Paul Post of tradition as what is ‘two dimensional’, as both “a continual re-contextualization” and a continuance of what is named the ‘traditional tradition’ (56).  Though Post attempts to develop a more fluid, ‘vital’ notion of tradition against the “old, static” notion he deems problematic (58), he nevertheless retains an inside/outside logic akin to Hobsbawm’s old/new (6) or Thomas’ self/other logic, which demands that there remain some untouched residue or core of identity and hence of presence underlying the changes a given tradition undergoes. It should then come as no surprise when, in the last lines of his paper, Post poses such questions as ‘What is the identity of the tradition of Christian ritual/liturgical music?’ and ‘How can this identity be preserved through the constant, dynamic, contingent interaction of cult and culture?’ (59).  The enabling condition for posing such questions is the assumption that tradition has an identity, literally, a ‘sameness’, only on the surface or outside of which there is dynamism and contingency.   

I would like to question tradition here, to see whether it is identical, whether it is a self-same continuity between past and present whereby the past is transmitted in essentia to the present.  What is its genealogy, its movement? How does it carry itself?

As is often the case we can locate an opening for thought within language, through the word itself.  Perhaps we can begin to understand tradition by listening to what it has to tell us, what it wants to tell us.  The word, of Latin origin, from tradere, has a twofold sense, a fascinating playful paradox, which pours forth as a fluid movement.  In its singularity it signifies both a ‘transmitting’ and a ‘betraying’.   

 

Tradition reaches across (space and time), a sense reflected in its twofold origin, an origin which further unveils the logic of its movement. The verb tradere is a composite, deriving from the preposition trans, which literally means ‘on’ or ‘to the other side’ and the verb dare, which means ‘to give’. Thus, tradition is always already a giving on or to the other side, a handing down which is a surrendering. Its logic is a simultaneous transmittance and betrayal, it transmits by betraying.  In the very act of giving it is already on or moving towards the other side of itself, in its very giving it is self-othering. It does not give over a quidditas or whatness, an essence, but betrays such a potentiality through its fluid self-othering movement.  Thus, the ‘invention’ or ‘creation’ of tradition never takes place within a space created by an inside/outside logic; for tradition contains and internally situates its own outside, its own internal-externalization.               

 

Nietzsche’s remark in Der Antichrist that “in truth, there was only one Christian, and he died on the cross” arose from his belief that St. Paul had invented Christianity, since Jesus’ life had in fact been a radical critique and rebellion against organized religion. Paul, according to Nietzsche, had betrayed the life of Jesus by traditionalizing or creating a tradition out of his life and words.  Christianity is not a ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ tradition, because it began as a betrayal of a singular life that was not a tradition, not something static and unchanging.  The life of Jesus was not meant to give birth to a tradition and so it is in reality nothing more than a betrayal.         

 

Yet Paul’s betrayal of the ‘memory’ of Jesus and his ‘invention’ of the Christian religious tradition was not the originary betrayal of Christianity. Paul was emulating Judas. It was Judas’ betrayal of Jesus that lead to Jesus’ crucifixion and his becoming Christ.  It was through this originary betrayal that the Christian tradition began. What Nietzsche believed to be a betrayal as abandonment of the tradition embodied by Jesus was in fact a betrayal as tradition, a betrayal that was tradition in its very movement. Tradition dwells within continuity through its continual self-betrayal. The continuity of tradition lies in its self-othering movement, not in a self-same permanence. As Jesus says to Judas in The Gospel of Judas, “you will exceed all of them [i.e., the Apostles], for you will sacrifice the man that clothes me” (56). It is only through the betrayal of Jesus that Christ will arise, that a bridge between heaven and earth, humanity and the divine will be formed. Judas’ betrayal, to be later followed by that of Paul, is the origin of the being in perpetuity of the Christian tradition, of Christianity. There is no tradition without betrayal.  The gospel continues: “They approached Judas and said to him ‘What are you doing here? You are Jesus’ disciple’” (58).  They did not understand the sacrifice, the betrayal required to perpetuate the tradition, to spread the Word. Judas did, and so he simply “answered them as they wished. And he received some money and handed him over to them” (58).     

 

In reality the self-othering movement of tradition does not provide for a singular or original origin just as much as it does not provide for a singular or teleological end. Thus, we can only speak of Judas’ betrayal as marking the originary moment of the coming into being of the Christian religious tradition as it is understood in a limited sense. The tradition marked by the word ‘Christianity’ did not begin with this betrayal, but can be traced back into prehistory and perhaps atemporality. Practically speaking, there is the Old Testament, the cult of Dionysus and various other traditions which were betrayed in the coming into being of Christianity. This logic presents the potential for recovering an originary tradition or self-othering movement, which is at work amidst the diversity of our traditions. What would come to pass with such a logic would be the realization that a comparison of various traditions would not be a comparison of isolated and divided particular or individual traditions external to one another, but a comparison of the various self-othering movements of an originary human tradition or self-betrayal.    

 

This reading of tradition casts new light on the prevalent self-righteous slogan of remaining ‘true to tradition’, of being loyal and steadfast in the face of all those who desire to ‘corrupt’ and ‘betray’ it; for, as we have seen, it is exactly those who betray a tradition, who are its most ardent defenders. Rather than be suspicious of the thinker who ‘betrays tradition’ by appropriating it in fruitful and rich ways, we would be better served by being suspicious of those who claim that loyalty to tradition consists in the ‘honest’ and ‘pure’ transmission of what is essential to it. In this context the only difference between these two groups is that whereas the former is honest about its engagement, its being in community, with the originary movement of tradition through its betrayal and hence continuation, the latter conceals its complicity, its involvement in tradition’s own betrayal, in its self-othering movement. Faithfulness to tradition can only be sought in its betrayal. If tradition were to ever cease its movement of self-betrayal, it would die, it would become its own sepulchre, its own memory.           

 

 

As soon as tradition has come to be recognized as tradition, it is dead.

                                                      – Allan Bloom -

Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, Cimetière de Montparnasse in Paris

Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, Cimetière de Montparnasse in Paris

 

~ by Babak on November 16, 2008.

4 Responses to “Self-othering Tradition”

  1. Hi Babak,

    I enjoyed your post this week, particularly regarding the issue of identity of tradition. You make a good point by addressing the underlying assumptions of many scholarly questions regarding tradition when you state: “The enabling condition for posing such questions is the assumption that tradition has an identity, literally, a ‘sameness’, only on the surface or outside of which there is dynamism and contingency.”

    In examining the basis of these assumptions, you discuss the meaning of the word tradition itself, which I always enjoy! I really found the notion of tradere as meaning both a transmission and a ‘betraying’ fascinating, as it sheds light the way tradition can be understood and interpreted as a fluid concept, rather than a static notion. Your statement: “In the very act of giving it is already on or moving towards the other side of itself, in its very giving it is self-othering” makes me wonder: how does such a notion apply to religions traditions that are interpreted as exclusivist, as well as those that are seen as pluralistic? That is, how does the process of self-othering affect the tradition that is enacting the self-othering? When a tradition asserts (or seems to exert) its ‘truth’, is it simultaneously asserting an external, outside ‘truth’? If a tradition “…transmits by betraying”, is it effectively transmitting everything outside of itself? Is it possible to say that by transmitting or persisting, a tradition is defining (and validating) within itself everything that remains outside of it? If a tradition has no static essence, no persistence ‘self’ and all traditions are defined internally by externalization, how can more than one tradition exist? Your statement “…that comparison of various traditions would not be a comparison of isolated and divided particular or individual traditions external to one another, but a comparison of the various self-othering movements of an originary human tradition or self-betrayal” seems to provide me with a possible answer to explore. Your discussion brought up all these questions, which I am still trying to figure out! Hopefully we can talk about it some more in class.

    - Adam

  2. Adam,

    Thanks for your comment. I left the paper here, with this fascinating implication of such a reading of tradition, because it opens up many questions and paths for thought. I have some thoughts about this, as to where we can go from here, as to what it would mean for tradition to be a movement which may not be external to anything, that all traditions may share in a ‘community of betrayal’. Perhaps, if there’s time, we can discuss this more in class.

    See you there,
    Babak

  3. Babak,

    You’re notion of propagating tradition through betrayal was quite an original way of thinking about transmission. However, I must admit that I do not agree with your views on this. In fact, I don’t know that we can even appropriately term Paul’s actions a betrayal of Christianity as Nietzsche went so far to maintain. Rather, I think it would be more appropriate to consider it an interpretation of Jesus, his role, and message. Furthermore, Jesus himself propagated religion and attempted to remain “true to tradition”. Indeed, we must recall that he too was a Jew. Indeed, his interpretation of Judaism differed from other sects at the time such as the dominating Pharisees and Sadducees, as well as the smaller group of Essenes. Similarly, Paul thought of himself as being under the banner of Judaism. Consider Philippians 3:2-6 where Paul outlines his ‘Jewish credentials’:
    2Watch out for those dogs, those men who do evil, those mutilators of the flesh. 3For it is we who are the circumcision, we who worship by the Spirit of God, who glory in Christ Jesus, and who put no confidence in the flesh— 4though I myself have reasons for such confidence.
    If anyone else thinks he has reasons to put confidence in the flesh, I have more: 5circumcised on the eighth day, of the people of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of Hebrews; in regard to the law, a Pharisee; 6as for zeal, persecuting the church; as for legalistic righteousness, faultless.
    On the other hand, one could make the case, of course, that both Jesus and Paul break with tradition as you write; however, my issue is that neither one of them would have seen themselves as doing such. Rather, they both attempt to provide what they believe is the proper interpretation of Jewish tradition. I hardly see this as a betrayal of the tradition; rather, they are interpreters of the tradition just as the early rabbinical writings were interpretations of the tradition. Can Nietzsche (a 19th century philosopher) legitimately go as far as to say that he understands the message of Jesus better than Paul (a 1st century Pharisaic Jew who began his missionary work as little as five years after Jesus’ mission)? For in his assertion that Paul was not in continuity with Jesus is to state that either Paul misunderstood Jesus or that he disregarded the teachings of Jesus. Moreover, it implies that Nietzsche himself believes he has a better understanding of Jesus than Paul.

    Finally, I will leave off on a slightly different note. Supposing you were correct in your analysis that Paul’s teachings were a betrayal of “the ‘memory’ of Jesus”, would you maintain that to remain true to any tradition involves a betrayal? Or is this way of perpetuating tradition a strictly western phenomena? Are humans doomed to this perpetual segregation from one another? I appreciate your notion about the presupposition of “a core identity or internal sameness that sustains an essential traditionality within a given tradition as it externally changes”, but all tradition be the result of the departure from normative belief and action?

    Let me know what you think,

    Andrew

  4. Hi Andrew,

    Thanks for your detailed comment. I’ll say a few things and perhaps we can discuss things further in person, if you like.

    Do Paul’s and Jesus’ belief that they were just ‘interpreters’ of Judaism exclude them from the movement of tradition, of its necessary betrayal, its logic? Does it somehow ‘prove’ that they didn’t betray the Judaic tradition? The Jews, the immense majority who did not convert, would disagree! Not that this means much to me, because the logic speaks for itself and I just used the Christian example as one possible piece of ‘evidence’. I would hold the same about the ‘internal’ movements of a tradition itself, of the Jewish tradition, as you mention, for example. This is not to even address the issue of what ‘interpretation’ entails. For example, are you assuming here that to ‘interpret’ is to represent some ‘truth’ or to replicate an identity without difference? How are interpreter not betrayers? Assuming that there is even something called ‘truth’ as a self-sameness, an identity that can be interpreted and thereby represented in its pure state, why and how can we claim that Jesus and Paul did in fact interpret truthfully at all or any more than, say, Nietzsche? And why is it that historical proximity gives Paul more ‘authority’ here? I could, as one of many possibilities, argue that Paul was self-interested, too close, that he had objectives in reading and ‘creating’ the tradition, reading Jesus as he did, whereas Nietzsche was removed and not motivated by ulterior motivations. Of course, in reality, no one is free of ‘ulterior motivations’, Nietzsche no less than Paul, but this works both ways: Paul no less than Nietzsche or any other.

    As a side note, Nietzsche’s argument is a powerful one that has been taken seriously by scholars. I just use it ‘lightly’, but he develops it over the years and does so with great insight. The reality is that Paul was seminal for the early cohesion and organization, not to mention propagation, of the Christian faith. I mean, in no other scriptural text is a single individual so influential as concerns the formation of orthodoxy and doctrine. If you look at early Patristics, you can see how often they quote Paul, not even the Gospels, to argue for a particular orthodoxy, whether moral or otherwise, against, in opposition to others, to Gnostics, Jews and so on. This is just history, my concern is more with the logic that underlies it. There’s also the immense influence Paul’s language, his Greek, had on the formation of an orthodox Christian lexicon, first in Greek itself and then in Latin, through Jerome and others.

    Now, as for your question, I can say that I don’t believe that there is anything ‘normative’ or ‘true’, in the traditional sense, that’s not constructed. I see betrayal as the natural logic of tradition, of its self-othering movement. Tradition happens thus, it move thus, whether or not Jesus, Paul, Nietzsche or you and I want it to. I see this as rich and productive. I see Jesus’ betrayal as rich and beautiful, not as something ‘blasphemous’, as did the Jewish authorities, for example. As you saw, I also read against Nietzsche here, who sees betrayal as something pejorative, as something negative. If tradition were not self-othering, self-betraying, it would be nothing at all. At the moment that something is no longer appropriated, as soon as it loses its potential to become other than it is, it dies, becomes static, a corpse. The movement of tradition is beautiful and rich because it’s lively, alive.

    I’m sure we’ll talk more about this.

    Babak

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